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A NOTE ON VERISIMILITUDE AND ACCURACY
RANDALL G. MCCUTCHEON
Abstract. Schoeneld has constructed examples of proper inaccu-
racy measures that value verisimilitude (in a certain sense) in spaces
of worlds equipped with a particular variety of verisimilitude metric.
However, Schoeneld left it as an open question whether `for every
space of worlds, there is a proper inaccuracy measure that values
verisimilitude.' Here we answer this question in the armative.
Let 
 = f!1; : : : ; !ng be a set of worlds. We represent credence functions
on 
 as n-tuples a = (a1; : : : ; an), where ai  0 and a1 +    + an = 1.
(ai represents credence in f!ig.) An inaccuracy measure on 
 is a real-
valued function I giving, for each pair (a; !), where a is a credence
function and ! 2 
, the `inaccuracy' I(a; !) of a should ! turn out to
be actual. I is proper if it has the property that the expected inaccuracy
of a is minimized for a equal to the actual chances, and strictly proper
if the minimum is uniquely realized at the actual chances.
It is usually supposed that inaccuracy is blind to similarities be-
tween the worlds, and is in fact a function of (1) the credence one assigns
to the actual world, and (2) the distribution of credences one assigns to
the non-actual worlds. If I is that sort of inaccuracy measure then
(1
2
; 0; 1
2
) is no more inaccurate than (1
2
; 1
2
; 0) when !1 is actual, even if !3
is less similar to !1 (according to a similarity measure) than is !2.
A contrasting view values `truthlikeness'. It says that investing rel-
atively greater credence in non-actual worlds that are more similar to
the actual one is an epistemic good that should be reected in our mea-
sures of inaccuracy. Aiming to demonstrate the costs of the truthlikeness
view, Oddie ([2017]) shows that a certain principle that is `universally
embraced within the truthlikeness programme turns out to be incom-
patible with [...] propriety'. This principle, which Oddie terms `Weak
Proximity', requires that inaccuracy doesn't increase when one replaces a
credence function supported on a set E of worlds by a credence function
concentrated on an E-world closest to the actual world.
Schoeneld ([2019]) counters that a truthlikeness view needn't be
committed to anything so strong as Weak Proximity, arguing instead
that the commitment is to employ inaccuracy measures according to
which (in a certain sense) `holding all else xed, the more verisimilar
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credence function is more accurate.' Schoeneld thus replaces Weak
Proximity with a new truthlikeness relation (Proximity 1) satised by
certain triples (I;
; d), where 
 is a set of worlds, d a certain variety
of `disagreement metric' on 
 and I a proper inaccuracy measure, and
gives non-trivial examples of triples satisfying this relation.
However, Schoeneld concedes that `Since...my proofs will make use
of particular spaces of worlds, I will not have shown that for every space
of worlds, there is a proper inaccuracy measure that values verisimili-
tude'. Here we shall answer (in the armative) the question implicit
in this passage. Specically, we show that for arbitrary (
; d) (typical-
ly d will be a metric on 
, though all we assume is that d(x; x) = 0
and d(x; y) = d(y; x) > 0 when x 6= y) there exists a (strictly) proper
inaccuracy measure I that respects verisimilitude (in a certain sense).
Our rst step is to dene the relation that will play the role here
that Proximity 1 plays in Schoeneld's work.
Proxvexity: Consider a nite set of worlds 
 equipped with a dis-
tance measure d and let I be an inaccuracy measure on credence
functions over 
. Then (
; d; I) satises the Proxvexity relation if
I judges b to be strictly more accurate than c at wa 2 
 whenever
b(f!ag) > 0 and there is a partition P of 
 such that the following
conditions hold:
(a) Every cell of P has either one or two members, with at least one
cell having two.
(b) If f!g is a singleton member of P then b(f!g) = c(f!g).
(c) If f!; !g is a 2-element member of P with d(!a; !)  d(!a; !
)
then c(f!; !g) = b(f!; !g) and c(f!g) < b(f!g)  c(f!g).1
We remark that, apart from being more general, Proxvexity guaran-
tees stronger truthlikeness properties than Proximity 1 even within the
latter's domain of application. (In particular it requires, for the rele-
vant spaces, no restriction to partitions whose 2 member cells are such
that `the further of the two worlds...from wa disagrees with wa about all
the atomic propositions that the closer of the two worlds disagrees with
wa about [...]': see Schoeneld 2019.) Also, the inaccuracy measures
Schoeneld constructs are not (except in some articial cases) strictly
proper. So the following result is novel in several respects.
1Note: the latter inequality is strict if d(!a; !) = d(!a; !
). (To see this, just
switch the roles of w and w.)
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Theorem
For any nite set 
 of worlds that is equipped with a distance measure
d, there exists a strictly proper inaccuracy measure I such that (
; d; I)
satises the Proxvexity relation.
Proof
Since the theorem is trivial for spaces of fewer than three worlds, we
shall assume that 
 has at least three elements.
Let f : (0;1) ! (0;1) be any strictly decreasing function, for
example f(x) = 1
1+x
. Dene
I
 
(a1; : : : ; an); !k

=
X
1i<jn
f
 
d(!i; !j)

L
 
(a1; : : : ; an);Qij; !k

: (1)
Here Qij =

f!i; !jg
	
[

f!tg : t 62 fi; jg
	
and
L
 
(a1; : : : ; an);Q; !k

=   log
X
i2C
ai

;
where f!i : i 2 Cg is the cell of Q containing !k.
L
 
(a1; : : : ; an);Q; !k

is the inaccuracy of an agent having credence
function (a1; : : : ; an) over (!1; : : : ; !n) when wk is actual and the agent
is scored over the partition Q by the logarithmic inaccuracy measure,
which is strictly proper (see Good 1952). So, since any linear combina-
tion of proper inaccuracy measures with non-negative weights is itself a
proper inaccuracy measure, I is proper. In fact I is strictly proper, for
if ak diers from the actual probability then L
 
(a1; : : : ; an);Qij; !k

has
strictly greater than minimal expectation when k 62 fi; jg.
Finally we show that (
; d; I) satises the Proxvexity relation. Sup-
pose to this end that b = (b1; : : : ; bn) and c = (c1; : : : ; cn) are credence
functions over 
 and there are !a 2 
 and a partition P of 
 such
that (a), (b) and (c) are satised. (See above.) We will show that if
b(f!ag) > 0 then I judges b to be strictly more accurate than c at !a.
By induction, it suces to consider the case where P has exactly
one cell fw;wg having two members. If one of the members of this two
member cell is the actual world wa the result follows immediately, as in
this case b(f!ag) > c(f!ag) and
L
 
(b1; : : : ; bn);Qij; !a

 L
 
(c1; : : : ; cn);Qij; !a

for every 1  i < j  n, with equality only when f!i; !jg = f!; !
g.
We may therefore assume without loss of generality that !a = !1,
! = !2 and !
 = !3, with d(!1; !2)  d(!1; !3). Note that b1 = c1 =
r > 0, b2 + b3 = c2 + c3, f
 
d(!1; !2)

 f
 
d(!1; !3)

and c2 < b2  c3,
with b2 < c3 if f
 
d(!1; !2)

= f
 
d(!1; !3)

. Then
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I
 
(b1; : : : ; bn); !a

  I
 
(c1; : : : ; cn); !a

=f
 
d(!1; !2)
 
  log(b1 + b2) + log(c1 + c2)

+ f
 
d(!1; !3)
 
  log(b1 + b3) + log(c1 + c3)

=f
 
d(!1; !2)

log
r + c2
r + b2
+ f
 
d(!1; !3)

log
r + c3
r + b3
f
 
d(!1; !3)

log
r + c2
r + b2
+ f
 
d(!1; !3)

log
r + c3
r + b3
 0:
The nal inequality is strict2 if b2 < c3, and the penultimate inequal-
ity is strict if f
 
d(!1; !2)

> f
 
d(!1; !3)

. Since either b2 < c3 or
f
 
d(!1; !2)

> f
 
d(!1; !3)

must hold, we are done. 
We conclude with the following question, which asks whether the inaccu-
racy measure guaranteed by the above Theorem can be chosen bounded.
Question
Is it the case that for any nite set 
 of worlds equipped with a distance
measure d, there exists a strictly proper, bounded inaccuracy measure I
such that (
; d; I) satises the Proxvexity relation?
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2What must be shown in this case is that (r + c2)(r + c3) < (r + b2)(r + b3),
which after substitution of b3 = c2 + c3   b2, expansion and cancellation reduces to
(b2   c2)(b2   c3) < 0.
